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WHAT YOU DO NOT SAY CAN AND WILL BE USED
AGAINST YOU: PREARREST SILENCE USED TO
IMPEACH A DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution protects
citizens from government-compelled self-incrimination.' Traditionally,
involuntary or government-compelled statements have been inadmissi-
ble as evidence both during the prosecution's case-in-chief and during
cross-examination.2 The Supreme Court applied the fifth amendment
to the states3 since it recognized the amendment as the backbone of
the accusatorial system of criminal prosecution. The right guaranteed
by the fifth amendment became known as the right to remain silent.
1. "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. The policy for the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence was
to deter police misconduct. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913); see also Note,
"Evidence-Impeachment-Confession Taken in Violation of Miranda Rule Held Inadmis-
sible for Impeachment Purposes, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 772 (1967). The first exception to this
exclusionary rule was the collateral use exception. The courts used the exception when
the defendant testified at trial and made affirmative assertions to collateral matters
of the crime charged. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (when Walder denied
any prior drug connection, the prosecution was allowed to introduce contradictory
evidence for impeachment purposes only.) For full discussion on the collateral use ex-
ception see note, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 939 (1967); Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to Miranda, 62 NEV.
U.L. REV. 912 (1968); The validity of the collateral use exception was questioned in
Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436 (1966), where the Court held statements obtained
without the defendant's knowledge of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel
to be inadmissible both on direct and cross-examination. Id. at 477. Uncertain about
the effect of Miranda on Walder, courts denied application of the collateral use excep-
tion to unconstitutionally obtained statements. Greshart v. United States, 392 F.2d
172, 178 n.5 (9th Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court clarified the Miranda-Walder question
when it held that statements inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief due to the
lack of Miranda safeguards may be used for impeachment purposes to attack the
credibility of a defendant's trial testimony if their trustworthiness satifies legal stan-
dards. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); accord, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975).
3. 378 U.S. 1 (1963). The Court further stated:
Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from inducing a
person to confess through 'sympathy falsely aroused,' (citations omitted)
or other like inducement far short of 'compulsion by torture,' (citations
omitted) it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the States to resort to
imprisonment, as here, to compel him to answer questions that might in-
criminate him. The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state inva-
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Until 1980, the courts consistently refused to admit4 both silence at
the time of arrest5 and silence maintained pursuant to judicial assur-
ance of no penalty for such silence." Courts excluded the silence re-
gardless of the purpose for which the evidence was introduced.
Recently, the Supreme Court examined the use of prearrest
silence to discredit a defendant's exculpatory trial testimony. In the
landmark case of Jenkins v. Anderson,7 the Court concluded that the
sion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against
federal infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer
no penalty . . . for such silence.
Id. at 8. The fourteenth amendment reads in pertinent part: "No state shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
4. Only two of the many purposes for which evidence can be introduced,
are addressed in this note. One is to prove the truth of the facts asserted directly
and the other is impeachment use of otherwise inadmissible evidence to discredit the
witness' testimony. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE SS 33, 244 (2nd ed. 1972).
5. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In Doyle, the defendant gave an ex-
culpatory trial testimony of a frame-up while at arrest he had remained silent. The
Court rejected the use of post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes due to the
ambiguous nature of silence. Id. at 617-18.
6. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943): The Court stated:
An accused having the assurance of the Court that his claim of privilege
would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion of the privilege
could then be used against him. The allowance of the privilege could be
a mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected injuriously by it.
Id.
7. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). The facts of Jenkins are enlightening. Two weeks after
Jenkins stabbed and killed Doyle Redding, he turned himself over to the police. Jenkins
testified at trial that he killed Redding in self-defense. According to the exculpatory
story, Redding had robbed the defendant's sister on August 12, 1974. Jenkins, who
was near the scene of the robbery, attempted to capture the thieves. After his futile
attempt, Jenkins reported their location to the police. On August 13, 1974, Redding
allegedly attacked Jenkins with a knife, accusing him of reporting the robbery. Jenkins
struggled with Redding, stabbed and killed him. During cross-examination, the pros-
ecutor attempted to impeach the defendant's testimony by questioning him about his
prearrest silence:
Q. And I suppose you waited for the police to tell what happened?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. You didn't?
A. No.
Q. I see. When was the first time that you reported the things that you
have told us in court today to anybody?
A. Two days after it happened.
Q. And who did you report it to?
A. To my probation officer.
Q. Well, apart from him?
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use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility does not
violate the Constitution The Court reasoned that once the defendant
takes the stand he waives his right to remain silent and is subject
to cross-examination on all relevant areas.' It noted that cross-
examination is an essential tool for determining the credibility of
witnesses by requiring them to explain prior inconsistent statements
and acts. '°
State courts are not bound by Jenkins to admit prearrest silence
to impeach the testimony of a defendant." Local evidentiary rules
governing probative value and prejudice are still determinative of
relevance." Furthermore, Jenkins offers no guidance for fifth amend-
ment protection of prearrest silence.'3 Rather, the Court held that the
use of prearrest silence for impeachment purposes is not unconstitu-
tional.
The narrow holding in Jenkins leaves open many evidentiary and
constitutional concerns. The evidentiary concern is the admissibility
of non-probative evidence" that could prejudice the defendant.'5 The
constitutional concern is whether admission of non-probative evidence
violates the defendant's rights. These concerns are highlighted when
a court must decide whether prearrest silence is admissible to im-
peach a defendant's exculpatory testimony.
This note addresses the issue of whether prearrest silence should
be used to impeach a defendant's testimony. Even if a court deter-
mines that this evidence is relevant for impeachment purposes, cer-
A. No one.
Q. Did you ever go to a police officer or anyone else?
A. No I didn't.
Q. As a matter of fact, it was two weeks later, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Id. at 233. This questioning was an attempt to suggest that Jenkins would have spoken
out if he had killed in self-defense. Id. at 254.
8. Id. at 240.
9. Id. at 238.
10. Id. The Court analogized the use of silence as a prior inconsistent state-
ment or act for impeachment purposes.
11. Id. at 240.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 236 n.2: "We simply do not reach that issue because the rule of
Raffel clearly permits impeachment even if the prearrest silence were held to be an
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent." Id. For a factual account
of Raffel and the Court's holding, see notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
14. G. LILLY, EVIDENCE, S 2, at 2-3 (West 1978).
15. Eichel v. New York R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253 (1963) (admissibility depends
upon balancing the probative value of the evidence against the possibility of prejudice.).
1982]
Williamson: What You Do Not Say Can and Will Be Used Against You: Prearrest S
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982
540 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
tain problems exist. One problem is the jury's inability to distinguish
evidence used solely for impeachment from evidence which directly
proves the matter in issue. Another problem is the inconsistency be-
tween the use of prearrest silence to impeach and the traditional fifth
amendment concerns."6 Since the use of prearrest silence creates these
problems, it should not be admissible for any purpose.
USE OF SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has examined the law concerning the use
of a defendant's silence for impeachment purposes. In Jenkins,7 the
Court held prearrest silence constitutionally admissible to impeach
a defendant's exculpatory testimony at trial. An understanding of the
precedent which leads to the Jenkins decision clarifies to what ex-
tent silence may be used for impeachment.
Precedent indicates that the primary objective of the American
adversary system of justice is to determine truth. 8 To attain this ob-
jective, parties in a legal dispute argue the strength of their own con-
tentions and expose the weaknesses of their opponent's claims. The
requirement that a defendant testify under oath, and be cross-
examined by his opponents, arguably ensures much more credible testi-
mony than statements not subjected to these safeguards. 9 Since out-
of-court statements and conduct are not subjected to these safeguards,
they are suspect and generally inadmissible as hearsay.'
16. This note only addresses the use of prearrest silence for impeachment
during cross-examination.
17. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
18. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 185 (1948).
19. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1362, at 3-10 (Chadbourned rev. 1974); Morgan,
supra note 18, at 185-86:
No doubt the oath originally furnished a powerful stimulus to compliance
with its terms. Unquestioning belief in the inevitability of the punish-
ment which would follow its violation was well-nigh universal . . . and
compliance with its terms was imperative. The fear that cross-examination
may uncover falsehood ... is a strong stimulus to sincerity for the average
person.
Id. See also Falknor. Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192 n.3 (1940).
20. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE SS 244-45, at 580-81 (2d ed. 1972). See also Morgan,
supra note 18, at 185. Inadmissibility of out-of-court assertions is premised upon the
four hearsay dangers: 1) the use of language or non-verbal conduct which requires
the factfinder to interpret what the witness means; 2) sincerity; 3) memory; and 4)
perception. For a background on the admissibility of hearsay exceptions and which
out-of-court assertions are in fact admissible as nonhearsay, see S 4 J. WEINSTEIN,
EVIDENCE, Rule 803 (1974).
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The hearsay rule bars only those out-of-court assertions which
are offered to prove the truth of -the facts asserted.2 1 Because some
out-of-court assertions are necessary and reasonably reliable, hearsay
exceptions have been created.'m However, use of an out-of-court asser-
tion to impeach a witness' testimony is neither hearsay nor a hear-
say exception. 3 The out-of-court assertion is not introduced to prove
the truth of the matter contained in the assertion, but rather to attack
the credibility of a witness' testimony. '4 The desired result creates
doubt in the jury's mind as to the credibility of the particular witness.'m
One of the most effective impeachment tools is evidence of prior
inconsistent statements. These are statements made by the witness
on some previous occasion that are inconsistent with his present
testimony. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence" allow substan-
21. See, e.g., Lewis v. Insurance.Co. of North America, 416 F.2d 1077 (5th
Cir. 1969).
22. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, SS 254-55, at 614-15 (2d ed. 1972).
23. There are five methods of impeaching the credibility of a witness: (1) prior
inconsistent statements; (2) bias due to emotional influences such as family ties or
pecuniary interest; (3) character of a witness; (4) incapacity to observe, remember or
recount the matters about which the witness testified; (5) proof by other witnesses
that material facts significantly differ from the witness' version. See MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE S 33, at 66 (2d ed. 1972).
Evidence which falls within the category of hearsay exceptions or nonhearsay
is admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, out-of-court assertions
may be used to show that the statement was made (impeachment) or to show the
declarant's state of mind. An example of such a common law hearsay exception or
nonhearsay under the Federal Rule of Evidence 801 follows:
X says to Y: "My wife is beautiful and caring."
The next day, X's wife is murdered and X is suspected.
The defense will want to enter the statement not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, that is, that X's wife was beautiful and caring, but to show X's state of
mind toward his wife, from which it can be inferred that X loved his wife and did
not kill her.
24. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE S 33, at 66-67 (2nd ed. 1972). As used in the text, the
term "witness" includes the defendant who testifies in his own behalf. Another dif-
ference between introducing nonhearsay evidence to prove the truth of the facts
asserted and inadmissible hearsay for impeachment purposes is the time at which they
can be introduced at trial. The former can be entered during the case-in-chief while
the impeachment may only be attempted during cross-examination or rebuttal.
25. 3 WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE S 607(06), at 607-59 (1978).
26. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(A)'
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion of (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
19821
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tive use of some prior inconsistent statements in the prosecution's
case-in-chief, prior statements unconstitutionally obtained may only
be used for impeachment. The policy reason for the limited use of
tainted evidence is to deter police misconduct.27
Arguably, the same policy reason supports the limited use of
silence as evidence. Until Jenkins,8 prearrest silence could only be
admitted as evidence through the tacit admission rule." This allows
evidence of silence maintained in the face of an accusation, if the ac-
cusation gives rise to an inference that the defendant agrees with
it.' The underlying assumption of the rule is that an innocent man
will deny a false accusation, and thus, failure to deny tends to prove
the truth of the accusation. 1 The limitation of the admissibility of such
silence deterred police from making unwarranted accusations against
one who is not formally charged.' "If the unfortunate 'declarant' abides
by the maxim that 'silence is golden' and holds his tongue, he may
find police accusations brought into court against him as ... evidence
... against him."' Thus, to deter such police misconduct courts care-
fully scrutinize the rule. 4
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, of (B) consistent with his testimony and
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification
of a person made after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a represen-
tative capacity of (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adop-
tion or belief in its trust, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a co-conspirator or a party during the course and in fur-
therance of the conspiracy.
Hereinafter, the Federal Rules of Evidence will be cited as the Federal Rules.
27. 3 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE, S 607(09), at 607-84 (1978).
28. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, (1980).
29. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, S 161, at 353 (2nd ed. 1972).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 354.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 353.
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The Supreme Court first discussed the use of silence to impeach
in 1925.3 Raffel v. United States affirmed the use of evidence of silence
in one trial to impeach a defendant's denial of the crime charged in
a subsequent trial.' The Court reasoned that since the defendant took
the witness stand, he waived his fifth amendment immunity from self-
incrimination." Later, the Court disallowed prosecutorial comment on
a defendant's silence after the court had assured the defendant of
the right against self-incrimination.' Then, in Grunewald v. United
States,' the Court disallowed the use of the defendant's pre-trial silence
for impeachment on the theory that the silence was not inconsistent
with his later testimony. '° Distinguishing the issues presented, the
Court in Grunewald declined to decide whether or not Raffel remained
valid law."
35. 271 U.S. 494 (1925). In Raffel, the defendant was indicted and twice was
tried for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. At the first trial a pro-
hibition agent testified that after the tavern search, the defendant admitted owner-
ship. Raffel did not testify and because the jury could not agree, a mistrial resulted.
The prohibition agent testified once more at the second trial after which the defend-
ant took the stand and denied making any statement of ownership. The Court and
the prosecution asked Raffel to explain his prior trial silence and he was subsequently
convicted. Id. at 495.
36. Id. at 498.
37. Interestingly, Raffel draws its reasoning from Fitzpatrick v. United States,
178 U.S. 304 (1899) and Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1894), two cases which
did not involve silence. However, those cases laid the groundwork for the fifth amend-
ment immunity waiver which, according to the Court, placed the defendant on the
same level as an ordinary witness, who is open to any cross-examination of the facts
in issue:
Where an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence, takes
the stand in his own behalf and makes his own statement, it is clear that
the prosecution has a right to cross-examine him upon such statement
with the same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary
witness, as to the circumstances connecting him with the alleged crime.
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. at 315.
38. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1943) (the lower court gave
the defendant a choice either to testify or to refuse to do so). The Court has also
rejected such a choice. See note 7 supra.
39. 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (Income tax fraud case for failure to report 1938 income).
40. Id. at 424. It is here that the Court recognized that the meaning of "in-
consistency" is germane to the impeachment scope of prior inconsistent statements.
Grunewald's test for inconsistency is discussed at notes 128-35 infra and accompany-
ing text.
41. The failure to declare Raffel invalid was deliberate since the issues in
Raffel and Grunewald differed. Raffel was faced with a constitutional issue of whether
a defendant who takes the stand on a second trial can continue to take advantage
of the privilege asserted at the first trial. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 496. In Grunewald, the
evidentiary question was whether the cross-examination was probative in impeaching
the defendant's credibility. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 420.
1982]
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Faced with whether silence can be used as a prior inconsistent
statement, the Court reexamined Raffel and Grunewald in Stewart v.
United States.2 In Raffel, the Court held that once a defendant takes
the stand, he is subject to cross-examination on all areas.' Based on
this concept, the Court accepted without question the use of prior
trial silence as a prior inconsistent act to impeach a defendant's subse-
quent trial testimony." The Grunewald decision specifically stated that
since pretrial silence was consistent with a defendant's exculpatory
testimony, it could not be used as a prior inconsistent act for impeach-
ment purposes . 5 In Stewart, the Court reached the issue of whether
a defendant's prior trial silence was inconsistent with his exculpatory
testimony at trial. It held that neither Raffel nore Grunewald justified
the use of prior trial silence as a prior inconsistent act because the
Court had never found a basic inconsistency between silence and trial
testimony." Thus, the Court refused to allow the prosecution to ques-
tion a defendant about his prior trial silence. Despite its decision, the
Court did not overrule Raffel, but rather, permitted the two conflict-
ing decisions on the use of a defendants silence before trial to stand.
When the conflict between the prior silence cases again emerged,
the Court followed the rationale that since pre-trial silence is consis-
tent with a defendant's exculpatory testimony, it cannot be used as
42. 366 U.S. 1 (1965). In Stewart, after three trials on a murder charge, the
defendant testified only in the last trial when he dropped his insanity defense asserted
in the first two trials. On cross-examination, the prosecution commented on Stewart's
prior silence. The Supreme Court held such comment to be error. Id. at 2-5.
43. 271 U.S. at 497.
44. Id.
45. 353 U.S. at 422.
46. 366 U.S. 1, 5. In 1965, the Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
held that the fifth amendment forbids comment on the defendant's silence by the court.
In Griffin, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. He did not testify
at trial on the guilt issue but did so at a separate trial as to the penalty issue. The
California Supreme Court instructed the jury that a defendant has a constitutional
right not to testify but that inferences of guilt and truth of such matters which he
would be expected to deny or explain could be drawn if in fact he did not do so.
The Supreme Court found this to be reversible error. Id. at 610.
47. 422 U.S. 171 (1975). Hale was arrested for robbery after immediate cap-
ture from a getaway chase. He was taken to the police station, advised of his Miranda
rights and searched. When the search produced $150, Hale remained silent to ques-
tions about the origin of the money. At trial, Hale presented an exculpatory story.
He explained that the money which came from his wife's welfare check was to be
used for money orders and that he had fled because he feared connection with his
companion whom Hale knew to be carrying narcotics. The prosecution sought to im-
peach the defendant with his silence about his exculpatory story at the time of arrest.
Id. at 174.
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a prior inconsistent act for impeachment." In United States v. Hale,
the Court further held that the numerous motivations to remain silent
make the maintenance of silence ambiguous.'9 Because the Court deter-
mined no clear method of ascertaining why the defendant remained
silent before trial, it prohibited the use of silence for any purpose.'
The Court's determination that silence is ambiguous is supported by
a defendant's Miranda rights. The Miranda rights provide one more
motivation for a defendant to remain silent."
A defendant's post-arrest silence may be an exercise of his right
to remain silent.52 A year after the Miranda decision, the Court relied
on its previous determination of the ambiguity of silence and held
that since silence may be nothing more than an invocation of those
rights enumerated in the Miranda warnings, "every post-arrest silence
is insolubly ambiguous."' The Court concluded that allowing post-
arrest silence to impeach subsequent trial testimony would be funda-
mentally unfair.5"
Despite these cases which prohibit post-arrest silence, the Court
held prearrest silence constitutionally admissible to impeach a defen-
dant's exculpatory trial testimony.' The Court stated that once a
defendant takes the stand, he has waived his fifth amendment im-
munity and thereby subjects himself to all areas of cross-examination.57
Furthermore, the Court permitted prearrest silence to be used as prior
48. Id. at 175.
49. Id. at 176. Further development of the ambiguity of silence is dealt with
in notes 87-95 infra and accompanying text.
50. Id.
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda rights read as follows:
The defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id. at 479.
52. See note 51 supra.
53. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle was arrested and charged with
a marijuana sale to police officers. The defendant remained silent during and after
arrest but later testified that he had been framed. In an impeachment effort, the pros-
ecution asked Doyle to explain his post-arrest silence about the claimed frameup. Id.
at 611, 613.
54. Id. at 617.
55. Id. at 617-18.
56. 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980). For a factual account of Jenkins, see note 7
supra; Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
57. 447 U.S. at 238.
1982]
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inconsistent statements or acts and left the balancing of probative
value and prejudice to the states. 8
Thus, prearrest silence can be constitutionally used to impeach
a defendant's testimony. 9 However, because of the narrow holding
in Jenkins,"0 many questions remain as to the relevancy of prearrest
silence, the prejudice of using silence to impeach, and traditional fifth
amendment concerns.
The Relevance of Prearrest Silence To Impeach A Defendant's Testimony
Although the Court held that prearrest silence, as a constitu-
tional matter, was admissible to impeach a defendant's exculpatory
testimony, it did not posit any guidelines for the evidentiary concerns
of relevance and prejudice."' Rather, the Jenkins decision specified
that the relevance of a defendant's prearrest silence is a question of
state evidentiary law.' The Court's failure to address evidentiary rules
in these areas exacerbates the problem of differing state standards.
Due to these divergent standards, the issue arises whether prearrest
58. Id. at 23940.
59. Id. at 240-41.
60. See notes 8 and 56 supra and accompanying text; Jenkins did not confine
its use of precedent to those cases strictly concerned with silence but rather looked
to Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Charged with two heroin sales to a police
officer, Harris took the stand and denied one sale but conceded making the other which
he claimed to be a sale of baking powder. On cross-examination, the prosecutor im-
peached Harris with statements he made prior to any Miranda warnings. Id. at 222-24.
Accord, Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (correct Miranda warning; the defendant
gave a statement after he requested counsel).
In Harris, the Court held that constitutionally inadmissible statements may
be used for impeachment purposes if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards.
Id. at 222-25. The dissent strongly suggests that such impeachment use of illegally
obtained evidence is indeed an incentive for police misconduct. Id. at 231-32 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Because the defendant did not claim that his statements were involun-
tary or coerced, they were admissible as prior inconsistent statements to impeach
his trial testimony. Id. at 225-26. Haas merely reaffirmed Harris. Oregon v. Haas, 420
U.S. at 723. Therefore, utilization of Raffel, Harris and Haas supported the permissi-
ble use of a defendant's prearrest silence to discredit his exculpatory testimony at trial.
61. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238-39.
62. Id. at 239 n.5.
63. The following have denied the use of prearrest silence for impeachment
purposes as irrelevant: the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Rowe, 618 F.2d 1204
(7th Cir.), cert. granted, 949 U.S. 810 (1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 810 (1980));
the Sixth Circuit, Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975); New York, People v.
Conyers, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 400 N.E.2d 342, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980); Colorado, People v.
Cole, 551 P.2d 210 (Co. App. 1976), affd, People v. Cole, 570 P.2d 8 (Colo. App. 1977)
and Florida, Weiss v. State, 341 So. 2d 528 (Fla. App. 1977); Webb v. State, 341 So.
2d 1054 (Fla. App. 1977); Brooks v. State, 347 So. 2d 444 (Fla. App. 1977). Those states
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silence is relevant to impeach the credibility of a defendant's ex-
culpatory testimony given at trial. To fully analyze the relevance of
prearrest silence, it is necessary to define silence" and analyze its
meaning in terms of case precedent, hypothetical fact situations,"5 and
various theories on its relevancy.6 Such analysis can only be com-
prehended when there is a basic understanding of relevance.
Relevancy-Its Definition And Application
Relevance is the foundation upon which the admissibility and ex-
clusion of evidence rests." The Federal Rules define relevancy as a
relationship between an item of evidence and a "fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action." 8 Most courts ask whether
a reasonable person would believe that the offered evidence renders
the desired inference more probable than it would be without the
evidence. 9 The judge has a duty to identify terms of a relevancy rela-
tionship in the particular case where relevancy is not immediately
apparent."0
Without a judicial finding of relevancy, one can only speculate
how the proffered evidence may affect the probability of the conse-
quential fact. If it is impossible to demonstrate such an effect, the
which have allowed its use include Maryland, Robeson v. State, 39 Md. 365, 386 A.2d
795 (1978) and Kansas, State v. Taylor, 223 Kan. 261, 574 P.2d 210 (1977).
Because federal courts utilize state laws in habeas corpus cases, uniformity
of standards is threatened. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 n.40 (1962). The only power
that federal courts have over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. The law used to accomplish such review is
state law. The uniformity of federal courts is not threatened as a matter of strict
federal criminal prosecutions. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 374 (1980).
64. See notes 76-78 infra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 102-10 infra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 92-121 infra and accompanying text.
67. Advisory committee notes following FED. R. EVID. 402.
68. FED. R. Evm. 401: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable than it would be without the evidence." See also James, Relevan-
cy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941).
69. United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The court's
function in determining relevancy is "only to decide whether a reasonable man might
have his assessment of the probabilities of a material proposition changed by the piece
of evidence sought to be admitted. If it may affect that evaluation it is relevant and,
subject to other rules, admissible." Id. at 56; 1 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE, S 401(07), at
401-27 (1978).
70. McCormick describes the judicial role in a discussion of the relevance of
a defendant's attempted escape to show consciousness of guilt:
There are no statistics for attempts at escape by those conscious
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evidence should be excluded." Thus, to be relevant and therefore ad-
missible, the offered evidence must tend to make the existence or
nonexistence of a fact more probable.
Relevancy Requires That Silence Have Meaning
To be relevant, silence must have some meaning which has a
probative effect on a consequential fact. For silence to have meaning,
a party must either intend his silence to communicate his beliefs"2
or remain silent when accused of a crime." In a criminal prosecution,
a defendant's silence has meaning if it gives rise to a reasonable in-
ference of guilt or material issue.74 The Court held that silence dur-
ing and after arrest is ambiguous and irrelevant to establish an in-
ference of guilt. To determine whether silence before an arrest is
communicative, the courts must consider a tacit admission or silence
in general which is ambiguous and therefore irrelevant.
It is difficult to define silence. In Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle
Ranch Co., the Supreme Court held that silence is not necessarily
equivalent to a false representation and suggested that mere silence
was quite different from concealment." A lower court stated that
silence was a species of conduct, and constituted an implied assertion
of the existence of the state of facts in question. 7 These two cases
of guilt and those not so conscious which will shed light on the probabili-
ty of the inference. The answer must filter through the judge's experience,
his judgment, and his knowledge of human conduct and motivation. He
must ask himself, could a reasonable man believe that the attempt makes
it more possible that he was conscious of guilt, and if the answer is yes,
the evidence is relevant.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, S 185, at 438 (2d. ed. 1972).
71. The analytic process for determining whether or not evidence is relevant
in a conspiracy prosecution is seen in United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216,
1225 (1st Cir. 1979). In a narcotics conspiracy prosecution, evidence that cash in ex-
cess of $5 million had been deposited with the cash brought into the bank in suitcases
was properly admitted since "the jury might reasonably believe that one engaged in
a legitimate commodities business would not operate in this way" and could "logically
infer that the defendants were in fact engaged in illicit activities of the sort indicated
in the other evidence." Id. See also, St. Clair v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 279 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1960). The Second Circuit reversed the district court decision to admit the
plaintiff widow's testimony about her pre-marital relationship with the deceased as
evidence of the decedent's ability to financially support his family.
72. FED. R. EvID. 801 and the advisory notes following the rule.
73. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 83-86 infra and accompanying text.
75. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
76. 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888).
77. Carmine v. Bowen, 104 Md. 198, 204, 64 A. 932, 934 (1906).
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demonstrate the difficulty of defining silence. In one case, the Court
found silence to be essentially non-communicative, whereas in the
other, the lower court determined silence to hold some aspects of com-
munication. While in some instances silence is communicative, the
defendant may not intend that his prearrest silence be communica-
tive."
In the absence of an accusation, prearrest silence is a non-
response, that is, there is nothing to which a defendant can respond.
Arguably, a defendant who remains silent before arrest and before
being confronted with any charges does not intend his non-responsive
silence to be communicative. Even if instances exist where a court
would find prearrest silence communicative, the numerous motivations
to remain silent would make a defendant's silence ambiguous.79 But
the point remains that in the absence of an accusation, silence does
not appear communicative.
A relevancy problem not only exists when a defendant does not
intend to communicate through silence, but also when he remains silent
in the presence of an accusation. The relevance of silence to a par-
ticular fact is often dependant upon an inference that a person would
not have acted as he did unless he believed that same particular fact
to exist. This inference is most often used in the context of tacit
admissions where an accused is silent in the face of an accusation."'
Courts have sometimes relied on the maxim that "silence indicates
78. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). A statement, as defined by the Federal Rules, is "an
oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct," which is intended as an assertion.
The advisory committee notes following Federal Rule of Evidence 801 explain that
non-assertive silence is excluded from the hearsay category because the dangers of
memory, narration and perception of the actor, though untested, are minimal in the
absence of an intent to assert.
79. See notes 92-95, 102-107 infra and accompanying text for extensive discus-
sion of the ambiguity of prearrest silence.
80. Munice Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1182 n.6.
(5th Cir. 1975).
81. The courts have used the tacit admission rule with caution because first,
the nature of the evidence is an open invitation to manufacture evidence, which must
be guarded against. People v. Aughinbaigh, 36 Ill. 2d. 320, 323, 223 N.E.2d 117, 119
(1967). Second, Miranda imposed constitutional limitations on this type of evidence.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). Third, there is such a subtle distinc-
tion between offering the evidence for the truth of the facts asserted and offering
it to show acquiescence, and therefore because the statement is ordinarily very damag-
ing, assurance of acquiescence is required by the following:
a) the statement must have been heard by the party accused of consent;
b) the accused must have understood the statement;
c) the subject matter must have been within his knowledge;
d) the accused must have been capable of response;
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consent" to justify the relevancy in -admitting evidence of the accusa-
tion and the silence. 2
Alternatively, other courts justify the relevancy of silence or non
action by adopting the belief that the natural act of an innocent man
is to deny an injurious charge. 3 Silence in the face of an injurious
accusation is therefore unnatural and may create an inference of guilt.'
Courts have found that acts of flight, threats, and changing appearance
are relevant to infer consciousness of guilt. These acts appear un-
natural for an innocent man. However, even these acts are inadmissi-
ble when prejudice outweighs relevance or when it is questionable
whether the jury can draw a reasonable inference of guilt from them.'
For silence to be admissible, it must reasonably indicate guilt
and not merely indicate an unnatural act. 7 The Court held that the
jury cannot draw a reasonable inference of guilt from post-arrest
silence.' Since silence that merely indicates unnaturalness is irrele-
vant to determine consciousness of guilt, it should not be relevant
e) and consideration of the age of the accused and his relationship to
the accuser.
See Gamble, The Tacit Admission Rule: Unreliable and Unconstitutional - A Doctrine
Ripe For Abandonment, 14 GEO. L. REV. 27 (1979).
82. Note, Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 938, 1036
(1968).
83. People v. Nitti, 312 Ill 73, 94, 143 N.E. 448, 455 (1924). But see United
States v. Hales, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring): Chief Justice Burger
suggested that it is not any more probable that the innocent rather than the guilty
protest their innocence. Id.
84. See note, supra 82, at 1039.
85. See United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1980) (the defendant
threatened a witness who had cooperated with the FBI); United States v. Morales,
577 F.2d 769 (2nd Cir. 1978) (while use of a false name on a suitcase containing heroin
was admissible to show consciousness of guilt which might be considered along with
all other relevant evidence bearing on the issue of whether the defendant knew she
was carrying narcotics, it was error to charge that this conduct was unequivocally
probative of guilt); United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 847 (1978) (evidence of flight may be relevant); United States v. Lind, 542 F.2d
598 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947 (1977) (the defendant's attempt to alter
his appearance before surrendering was relevant to his consciousness of guilt).
86. United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1978) Death threat
testimony may be relevant to consciousness of guilt, but severe prejudice may result
from the use of such evidence. Accordingly, its use is limited to situations where there
is a clear need for the prosecution to use such testimony; United States v. Hale, 422
U.S. 171, 180 (1975) (the jury is unlikely to distinguish between impeachment use and
substantive use of evidence); see note supra 83, at 1039.
87. See note supra 82, at 1039.
88. Hale v. United States, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
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to impeach a defendant's credibility. There are many reasons for main-
taining silence, a few of which include intimidation, confusion, and
fear." The Court suggested that because these are normal reactions
of a defendant, they should have no bearing on his credibility or con-
sciousness of guilt.' The Court used this rationale to hold that every
post-arrest silence is ambiguous since a defendant may be exercising
his constitutional right to remain silent.9
Prearrest Silence Is As Ambiguous As Post-Arrest Silence
Since the Court held post-arrest silence to be a constitutional
right of all defendants,9" it has not used a defendant's post-arrest
silence to infer guilt or to impeach his credibility. The Court, in
Jenkins, did allow such use of prearrest silence.9 A comparison of
post-arrest silence cases with cases involving prearrest silence will
show the impropriety of allowing prearrest silence to be used against
the defendant.
The Court found post-arrest silence to be ambiguous because of
the numerous reasons for a defendant to remain silent." These same
motivations to remain silent are inherent during the prearrest stage.
Intimidation, fear and emotional and confusing circumstances are three
seemingly normal reasons for silence during police investigation. This
is particularly true if a person does not consider himself to be a
suspect, or if, for some reason he is unable to remember the facts
of the crime or his involvement. Previous unpleasant contacts with
the police and courts could invoke such fear in a suspect that even
if he is innocently involved or at least knowledgeable about the crime,
he will not speak out.
Another plausible reason for the silence of a defendant who is
familiar with the judicial system is knowledge of the right to remain
silent.9" To allow arrest to trigger a defendant's fifth amendment right
89. Id. at 177.
90. Id.
91. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 n.8. Doyle adopted Hale's view of the
various and inherent ambiguities of motivations for remaining silent.
92. Id.
93. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
94. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177 (1975).
95. See note 51 supra. If the meaning of prearrest silence is interpreted literal-
ly, any silence that occurs between the completion of the crime and the arrest on
advice of counsel could be as damaging as if he had obtained no professional advice.
During the prosecution's cross-examination of the defendant in United States v. Raf-
fel, 271 U.S. 494, 495 (1926), the Court allowed the defendant's silence at a prior trial
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to remain silent is a dilution of that right which is guaranteed to all
citizens. Since a defendant could maintain prearrest silence because
of his knowledge of his fifth amendment rights, it follows that prear-
rest silence is as ambiguous as post-arrest silence. Because of its am-
biguity, prearrest silence is irrelevant either to infer guilt or to im-
peach a defendant's credibility. The irrelevancy of prearrest silence
is not only found when it is compared to post-arrest silence, but also
when it is compared to another prearrest act.
Prearrest Silence Contrasted To The Prearrest Act Of Flight
Flight to avoid the police and silence both may occur before for-
mal charges are filed. The courts are divided on whether an act of
flight from police is relevant to establish guilt.' Since silence is not
even an act, but a negative act, then logically, it should be less rele-
vant than the affirmative act of flight. A comparison of flight and
prearrest silence shows that prearrest silence should be irrelevant.
The Eighth Circuit held it erroneous to instruct the jury that
flight could be considered as evidence of guilt. 7 In United States v.
on the advice of counsel to impeach his testimony at the subsequent trial. However,
this rule is not universal. For example, Florida courts, on occasion, have reversed
the trial court and held prearrest silence on advice of counsel to be admissible for
all purposes. Weiss v. State, 341 So. 2d 528 (Fla. App. 1977).
This rejection of any prearrest silence when maintained upon advice of counsel,
is only one example of the divergent interpretations by the states of the scope of
prearrest silence. See note 63 supra and accompanying text for another example of
conflicting state laws concerning the use of prearrest silence. Because the Court in
Jenkins failed to delineate the scope of prearrest silence, at least two open questions
face the states. One is whether prearrest silence will occur when silence is directed
toward everyone or only the police. (See notes 109-10 infra and accompanying test).
The question is in which of these instances prearrest silence is significant. Another
issue is whether other evidentiary tools, such as admission of a party, make irrele-
vant the use of a defendant's prearrest silence. The relevancy examples in notes 111-120
infra and accompanying text show why the Court's refusal to find a constitutional
violation by impeachment use of prearrest silence in Jenkins should not be read as
a blanket authorization or endorsement of the admissibility of prearrest silence.
96. See United States v. Alonzo, 571 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 847 (1978). But cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963): "We
have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that the
accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime." Id.
It can be logically deducted that silence, a non-act, is intended to communicate
nothing. Flight, an act, is not intended to communicate, but is admissible to show the
actor's state of mind. Thus, one needs to speculate as to the actor's state of mind.
But, on the other hand, the meaning of silence seems far more speculative than that
of flight. Therefore, flight, which is of questionable probative value, seems far more
probative than silence.
97. United State v. White, 488 F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1973).
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White, the court used three factors to determine whether flight was
evidence of guilt. First, at the time of flight, the defendant had not
been informed of the crime with which he was subsequently charged."
Second, five months had elapsed since the occurrence of the alleged
crime and the defendant's flight." Third, the defendant was unaware
that he was being sought for such crime."° At least one of these fac-
tors may be pertinent to cases where the defendant has maintained
prearrest silence.
A person who is silent before arrest may have no knowledge
of the crime subsequently charged, in which case it would be normal
to say nothing. The only reason for his silence may be that he has
nothing to report. Therefore, silence is not probative of whether a
defendant committed the crime and it does not impeach a defendant's
credibility. Silence under these circumstances is irrelevant for impeach-
ment and for any other purpose.
The Evidentiary Ground Of Relevance Excludes the Use Of Prearrest
Silence
The Court decided whether prearrest silence is constitutionally
admissible for impeachment purposes, but made no evidentiary
determination.'' Facts similar to Jenkins require prearrest silence to
be inadmissible strictly on the evidentiary ground of relevance. In
a given fact situation, X left Y at Y's office following an exchange
of blows in a struggle over a disputed business deal. X then left town
on a business trip unaware that Y was dead. X was arrested two
weeks later and he claimed self-defense. Here, the defendant has
knowledge of the facts. Though the facts concerning the period of
prearrest silence and the exculpatory defense are similar to Jenkins'02
where the Court held use of prearrest silence to impeach
constitutional,'03 the post-arrest cases' exclude the use of silence on
evidentiary grounds of relevance.' 5 The Supreme Court previously
ruled on the evidentiary matter of post-arrest silence and found the




101. 447 U.S. at 239.
102. For the facts of Jenkins, see note 7 supra.
103. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
104. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
105. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239 n.5.
106. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 n.8.
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prearrest silence as well. Since the Court in Jenkins did not make
a ruling on the evidentiary issues of prearrest silence,"7 such an
analysis is consistent with that decision. Also, because of its ambigui-
ty, prearrest silence is irrelevant for any purpose.
The silence of a defendant who knows about his victims death
may be more relevant because of his knowledge of the facts of the
crime with which he is charged than a defendant who knows nothing
about the crime. The cases where a defendant knows enough to report,
and does not, is called a confession and avoidance case. Even if the
evidence of a defendant's prearrest silence in a confession and avoid-
ance case is relevant, it is inadmissible since the relevance does not
outweigh the prejudice to the defendant. A strong parallel exists be-
tween these two types of cases and the disappearing misprision stat-
utes.' Even though it is difficult to find prearrest silence relevant
on evidentiary grounds and, in contrast to the misprision statutes,
the source to which the defendant directs his silence may create
relevancy of the silence.
Prearrest Silence May Be Created When A Defendant Speaks to No
One Before Arrest Or When He Speaks To People Other Than The Police
I The time at which prearrest silence arises in issue may depend
on the person with whom the defendant fails to speak. This issue arises
in a fact situation where X killed Y in self-defense. Frightened, X
consulted his family before turning himself in to the police three days
later. X was not silent in the presence of his family, yet he remained
silent in the presence of the police.
107. Jenkins 447 at 240.
108. 18 U.S.C.A. 4 (West 1981): The Federal misprision statute reads as follows:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible
make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military
authority under the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
The misprision statutes stipulate that a person with sufficient knowledge of
a crime has a duty to report. When he has insufficient knowledge of the facts, no
duty exists. United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1977). There are two reasons
for the disappearance of the statutes. First, there is a fine line between having suffi-
cient and insufficient knowledge. Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. 556 (7 Wheat. 1822) ("It
may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender and to proclaim every offense
which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every case
for not performing this duty is too harsh for man." Id. at 575-76.) Second, required
reporting is incriminating and therefore violates the fifth amendment right to silence.
United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kuh, 541
F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976). Even the federal statute has fallen into disuse and would
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It is an unresolved question whether prearrest silence is confined
to non-verbal conduct with the police, or whether it encompasses all
periods of X's silence before arrest. Literal interpretation would mean
that prearrest silence embraces the total period from the time of the
crime to the time when X is arrested. If X speaks to his family, his
self-defense testimony may be challenged indirectly. For instance, if
a member of X's family testifies in his behalf that X in fact told him
immediately after the crime that he (X) killed Y in self-defense, the
family member is subject to impeachment through the use of bias."0 9
This would be an indirect attack on X's defense, or at least damaging
to his defense. In a situation where X did not claim self-defense in
the presence of his family, and a family member's trial testimony in-
criminates him, there is no need to impeach X by his prearrest silence.
X's statements to his family are admissible as nonhearsay. 0 Therefore,
since X's statements speak for themselves, his prearrest silence to
the police becomes irrelevant for impeachment.
The Relevance Of Prearrest Silence When Used In Conjunction With
Other Prearrest Acts
It seems highly prejudicial and unfair to impeach a defendant's
later testimony with his prearrest silence unless, perhaps, "silence"
acquires meaning when it is simultaneously exercised with other non-
verbal acts occuring before arrest. One state court held that since
the defendant's prearrest silence is "germane to his conduct, i.e., his
hiding from the police," it is admissible to impeach his credibility.'
The defendant knew there was a warrant for his arrest and acted on
be eliminated from the proposed new federal criminal code. See the National Commis-
sion on Reform of Federal Criminal laws - Final Report, Proposed New Federal Criminal
Code 1303 (1971), cited in W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW S 66, at 526 (1972). The problems
which have caused the disuse of the misprison statutes are found in the use of prear-
rest silence. In a situation where a defendant has insufficient knowledge about the
facts of the crime charged, his silence is irrelevant to impeach his exculpatory testimony.
Likewise, where sufficient knowledge triggers a duty to report, such prejudicial im-
position is not outweighed by any relevance it might have.
109. The law recognizes that a witness' emotions or feelings toward the defen-
dant may color his testimony. Partiality due to a relationship is a permissible area
of cross-examination to impeach a witness' credibility. See Williams v. State, 44 Ala.
App. 503, 214 So. 2d. 712 (1968).
In a fact situation where X talks to a stranger about his act of self defense,
the prosecution can not impeach him through bias as in the case of the family members.
110. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 reads in pertinent part: "A statement is
not hearsay if . . . [tihe statement is offered against and is . . .his own statement,
in either his individual or a representative capacity."
111. Robeson v. State, 39 Md. App. 365, 377, 386 A.2d 795, 801 (1978).
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this knowledge by remaining silent, by packing his clothes and mov-
ing to his girlfriend's apartment to evade the police."2 Accordingly,
the court deemed prearrest silence relevant to impeach his
credibility."'
Similarly, federal courts allow prearrest silence to impeach a
defendant's exculpatory testimony. In one case, when the police ar-
rived at the scene of the crime, the defendant fled behind another
suspect."' The defendant's trial testimony, that he ran with the in-
tent to catch the true assailant, was impeached by his failure to report
to the police what actually happened."' However, since flight, threats,
and changing appearance are relevant by themselves to show con-
sciousness of guilt,"' evidence of prearrest silence is unnecessary to
make these acts relevant. Since the silence is made more probative
only when considered in conjunction with the defendant's other pre-
arrest acts, it should be irrelevant as a means for impeachment."7
Even so, duration of the silence may be significant.
The Duration Of Prearrest Silence
If duration imputes meaning to the prearrest silence, it may be
relevant to the issue of guilt."8 It remains unresolved whether dura-
tion of the silence is significant. On the other hand, it may go to the
weight of the evidence, but presumably prearrest silence of one day
or as little as five hours could be used. If one day is the same as
one year with regard to the admissibility of impeachment use of prear-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 381, 386 A.2d at 803.
114. Ester v. United States, 253 A.2d 537 (D.C. 1979).
115. Id. at 538.
116. See note 85 supra and accompanying text; cf. State v. Taylor, 223 Kan.
261, 574 P.2d 210 (1977). Id.; see also Schuman v. Bader & Co., 227 Ill. App. 28 (1922)
(repairs not admissible to prove prior condition where plaintiff had proved such condi-
tion by other witnesses). Though Schuman is a civil action dealing with admissions
by remedial measures, it can be analogized to a case involving prearrest silence. If
a fact can be shown by other means, a defendant's prearrest silence is irrelevant and
thereby inadmissible.
117. Accord, Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980). The Court held that
the prosecutor's questions about the defendant's silence "were not designed to draw
meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement."
Id. at 409. See also States v. Franklin, 586 F.2d 560, (5th Cir. 1978).
118. Of the judicial opinions listing the duration of prearrest silence, the shortest
duration is seven days. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (fourteen days); United States
v. Rowe, 618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 810 (1980), vacated and remanded
449 U.S. 810 (1980) (seven days); State v. Clark 223 Kan. 83, 574 P.2d 174 (1977) (seven
days); Weiss v. State, 341 So. 2d 528 (Fla. App. 1977) (seven days).
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rest silence, the result is a deterrent to the reporting"9 of the inci-
dent at any time after the immediate occurrence. This is especially
true since the act of reporting is highly incriminating.'20 Once a per-
son delays reporting for whatever reason, his silence becomes a threat
to his trial testimony.
Prearrest Silence Is Irrelevant For Impeachment
Since the Supreme Court formulated no guidelines to determine
the relevancy of prearrest silence, states are developing conflicting
interpretations. The judicial struggle with the definition of silence
depicts this conflict. Because of the ambiguous nature of silence, unless
and until prearrest silence is clearly defined, it should not be admissi-
ble to impeach a defendant's later exculpatory testimony. It is highly
speculative whether the Court should consider certain features of
silence, such as duration and corroborative use, with other prearrest
activities to impute meaning to prearrest silence.
Not one area clearly establishes prearrest silence as relevant to
show any material issue-except that the defendant made a choice
to talk at one time, and not to talk at another time. Since introduc-
tion of such evidence could prove unduly prejudicial to the defendant,
its use seems fundamentally unfair.' 1 The process by which the proba-
tive value of a piece of evidence is weighed against its possible pre-
judice is delicate. The reasons for such balancing are set forth below.
PREJUDICE AND THE USE OF PREARREST SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT
Even if the evidence is relevant, the question remains whether
the probative value is worth the cost.1" Judge Learned Hand stated
119. Abbie Hoffman maintained an extremely long period of prearrest silence.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1980, S 1, ed. 5.
120. United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1979). The prosecution
of police officers under the Federal misprision statute for their failure to report a
narcotics sale violated their fifth amendment right against self-incrimination since such
disclosure would have led to their prosecution for a variety of crimes.
121. Relevant evidence is excluded if its prejudicial effect on the jury's deci-
sion outweighs its probative value. See United States v. Wright. 489 F.2d 1181, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1973). In Wright, the court refused to admit evidence showing a robbery
victim to be a homosexual who had made advances toward the defendant. Bias is un-
questionably highly relevant and rejection of a sexual advance may well give rise to
bias but such evidence was more prejudicial than probative so that though relevant,
it was not admitted. Id.
In Wright, the impact of the evidence was prejudicial to the prosecution. It seems
only fair that a defendant should have the same standard to exclude prejudicial evidence.
122. 1 J. WEINSTEIN EVIDENCE, S 403(01), at 403-7 (1980).
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that "[tihe competence of evidence in the end depends upon whether
it is likely, all things considered, to advance the search for truth...
and that does not inevitably follow from the fact that it is rationally
relevant."1 Thus, there are two issues ripe for examination. The first
is whether prearrest silence may be used as a prior inconsistent state-
ment for impeachment purposes. The second issue is whether such use
is so prejudicial to the defendant that it should be altogether barred.
Use Of Prearrest Silence As A Prior Inconsistent Statement Or Act
The Court in Jenkins124 suggested that distinctions between
statements and silence are immaterial for impeachment purposes.12
Prior inconsistent acts may reflect a defendant's credibility as accurate-
ly as prior inconsistent statements." Furthermore, silence can be con-
strued as an implied assertion and thus can be used as a prior incon-
sistent statement or act for impeachment purposes.'
For prearrest silence to be used as a prior inconsistent act for
impeachment, the silence must be inconsistent with the defendant's
exculpatory testimony. Most courts have defined inconsistency as
something that conflicts with the trial testimony.28 In Grunewald v.
123. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2nd Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
124. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
125. A very strong constitutional argument distinguishes statements from
silence. See notes 158-70 infra and accompanying text.
126. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238: "Attempted impeachment on cross-examination
of a defendant, the practice at issue here, may enhance the reliability of the criminal
process. Use of such impeachment on cross-examination allows prosecutors to test the
credibility of a witness by asking them to explain prior inconsistent statements and
acts." Id. But cf People v. Conyers, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 400 N.E.2d 342, 49 N.Y.2d 174
(1980); cert. granted, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), remanded and vacated, 449 U.S. 809 (1980)
in light of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231: "An inconsistent statement is much
more probative than is silence." Id. at 408, 100 N.E.2d at 348, 49 N.Y.2d at 182. But
see United States v. Harp, 513 F.2d 786, vacated, 423 U.S. 513 (1975). In Harp, the
court held that a defendant who elects to explain participation in a crime subjects
his testimony to the impeaching effect of prior inconsistent action.
127. See, e.g., Muncie Air Lines Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178,
1182 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. Some courts require varying degrees of inconsistency. United States v.
Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980) (inconsistency is not limited to diametrically op-
posed answers, inability to recall, silence or changes of position); Commonwealth v.
Rickles, 305 N.E.2d 107 (Mass. 1973) (prior inconsistent statements need not directly
contradict a witness' testimony, it is enough if its implications flow in a different direc-
tion); cf. State v. Clay, 29 Ohio App. 206, 280 N.E.2d 385 (1972). For a statement to
be admissible to impeach a witness, it must relate to material facts in the case, it
must be contradictory or be inconsistent with the witness' testimony at trial and tend
to disprove in some degree, the case of the party who called the witness.
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United States,1" where the silence in issue occurred at a grand jury
hearing, the Supreme Court held three factors to be determinative
of "consistency." Those factors were: repeated assertions of innocence
before the grand jury; the non-adversarial nature of the grand jury
in which there is no confrontation, no counsel, and compelled ap-
pearance; and the focus on the defendant that made it natural for
him to fear that he was questioned solely to provide evidence against
himself." In light of these three elements, the Court held that use
of the defendant's prior silence to impeach him in a subsequent trial
was improper." '
The Court later extended this decision and held that a defen-
dant's silence at the time of arrest to be improper impeachment
evidence."3 The Court, in United States v. Hale, stated that the three
factors provided an even stronger argument for consistency in the
case of silence at the time of arrest then they did for the Grunewald
defendant."= Prearrest silence does not involve a Grunewald grand
jury nor a Hale arrest, yet it also is a time during which the suspect
has no confrontation privileges, no right to counsel and a fifth amend-
ment right to remain silent. It is likely that a defendant will be silent
for the very reasons which Hale deemed to be ambiguous.'" Although
prearrest silence carries no express assertion of innocence, neither
does it express guilt. The prosecution contended that Hale's silence
at the time of arrest was probative of the falsity of his later trial
testimony because the incentive of immediate release, and the oppor-
tunity for independent corroboration, would have prompted an inno-
cent suspect to explain away the incriminating circumstances." The
Court disagreed and held that the defendant had no reason to think
that any explanation he might make would hasten his release." This
129. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). Charged with preventing criminal prosecutions of cer-
tain taxpayers for tax evasion, Halperin, another defendant, relied on the fifth amend-
ment and refused to answer grand jury questions. He later testified at trial, answer-
ing the same questions he had earlier refused to answer. The Court reasoned that
to answer the grand jury questions would have incriminated him but later answers
given at trial were consistent with innocence. Id. at 422. "For example, had he Halperin
stated to the grand jury that he knew Grunewald, the admission would have con-
stituted a link between him and a criminal conspiracy, and this would be true even
though his friendship with Grunewald was above reproach." Id.
130. Id. at 423.
131. Id. at 420.
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view, together with the numerous other explanations for silence, con-
vinced the Court that pretrial silence is not sufficiently probative of
an inconsistency with later testimony.' If the defendant realizes that
telling his exculpatory story will not guarantee either belief or release,
he may remain silent for fear of providing the police with self-incrim-
inating information.
This is especially true in the confession and avoidance cases
where the defendant has enough knowledge to report the crime. In
Jenkins, the Supreme Court assumes a natural motivation in the
average person to report." However, the typical defendant is not the
average person. The expected behavior of an average person to report
a crime to police is inapplicable to the typical defendant who fears
that he will not be believed. The court should not impeach the typical
defendant with his silence. Such use of prearrest silence would be
unduly prejudicial to the defendant since there is no inconsistency
between a fear to report and exculpatory testimony at trial.
If silence is introduced as a prior inconsistent act for impeach-
ment purposes, there must be an inconsistency between the prear-
rest silence and the trial testimony. However, the Supreme Court ig-
nored this requirement in Jenkins'39 by relying on Raffel v. United
States" ' where the Court assumed inconsistency without analysis."'
The Court's determination in Jenkins that prearrest silence may be
used to impeach as a prior inconsistent act"' is also based on the
assumption of inconsistency between prearrest silence and trial
testimony. Thus, the Court has ignored its previous decision' that
a prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach later testimony
only if inconsistent with that testimony.'" The improper use of silence
as a prior inconsistent act for impeachment may cause the jury to
premise its verdict on inadmissible evidence.
The Fear Of Jury Prejudice
When the jury gives a piece of evidence more weight than the
137. Id. at 180.
138. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
139. Id.
140. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
141. United State v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 175 (1975) interpreting Raffel to hold
that the inconsistency between the defendant's prior trial silence and his present trial
testimony was assumed.
142. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.
143. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391 (1957).
144. Gruenwald, 353 U.S. at 422.
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evidence warrants, the verdict may prejudice the defendant. In United
States v. Hale, the Court excluded silence for impeachment of a defen-
dant's testimony.145 The Court feared that the jury would assign much
more weight to the defendant's previous silence than the silence
warranted.1"' If the jury miscalculates the weight to be given to pre-
arrest silence, the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt will be alleviated at the defendant's expense. Em-
pirical studies show that juries do not distinguish between silence,
as evidence of the untrustworthiness of a defendant's exculpatory trial
testimony, and silence as substantive evidence of guilt.' 7 This uncon-
trollable and immeasurable inference of guilt makes the use of prear-
rest silence inherently prejudicial, outweighing any possible relevance
prearrest silence may possess.
Thus, prearrest silence should be inadmissible to impeach a defen-
dant's exculpatory trial testimony on the evidentiary grounds of un-
due prejudice to the defendant, even if such evidence is deemed to
be relevant. First, prearrest silence must be inconsistent with the later
trial testimony to be used as a prior inconsistent act to impeach such
testimony. Second, even if found to be inconsistent, the unknown in-
ference that will be drawn by the jury makes impeachment use of
prearrest silence so prejudicial to the defendant that the courts can-
not justify its use for any purpose. Accordingly, the prejudicial im-
pact of prearrest silence should preclude its admission to impeach the
defendant's exculpatory testimony.
TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND IMPEACHMENT
USE OF PREARREST SILENCE
To be admissible, evidence must satisfy evidentiary standards
concerning relevance and prejudice and must comply with traditional
constitutional concerns. Thus, even if prearrest silence is relevant and
its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact, it may not be
used for impeachment unless it fulfills the fifth amendment guarantees.
In Jenkins v. Anderson,'48 where impeachment use of prearrest silence
was held not to violate the Constitution, the Court did not reach the
issue of whether prearrest silence may be protected by the fifth
amendment.'49 The Court deemed the issue to be immaterial since the
145. 422 U.S. at 180.
146. Id.
147. See H. KALVEN AND H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 127-28, 177-80 (1966);
Hoffman and Bradley, Jurors On Trial, 17 Mo. L. REv. 235, 243-44 (1952).
148. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
149. Id. at 236 n.2.
1982]
Williamson: What You Do Not Say Can and Will Be Used Against You: Prearrest S
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982
562 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.16
Raffel rule,'1° that once a defendant takes the stand he waives his
fifth amendment immunity, permits impeachment "even if the prear-
rest silence were held to be an invocation of the fifth amendment
right to remain silent."' 51 Despite this ruling, fifth amendment con-
cerns should not be sidestepped. If the fifth amendment permits the
use of prearrest silence, which Jenkins did not decide,"" then the defen-
dant's right to testify in his own behalf, and his right against self-
incrimination, are seriously threatened." Traditional fifth amendment
concerns support this contention.
Traditional Fifth Amendment Concerns
The fifth amendment protects the right not to be compelled to
speak in an incriminating way." The guidelines set forth in Miranda
v. ArizonaM serve to prevent an infringement of the primary goal
of the fifth amendment which is voluntariness of any statement given
by a defendant. Voluntariness insures the trustworthiness of a defen-
dant's statement." If a statement must be given voluntarily to be
admissible in court, the voluntariness requirement deters the police
from coercing confessions.1 7 The requirement also preserves the defen-
dant's right to choose whether or not to make a pretrial statement
or to testify.5 If a statement is voluntarily given, it is deemed
trustworthy and in compliance with the fifth amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination.
150. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). The rule referred to by Jenkins
is that once the defendant takes the stand, he waives his immunity from giving
testimony and is subject to cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like any
other witness. Id. at 496-97.
151. Id. at 236 n.2.
152. Id. "Our decision today does not consider whether or under what cir-
cumstances prearrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment. We simply
do not reach that issue because the rule of Raffel clearly permits impeachment even
if the prearrest silence were held to be an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent." Id.
153. It is important to note, however, that despite the fifth amendment analysis
which follows, the current law, as set forth in Jenkins and Raffel, is that the use of
prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testimony is constitutional.
154. The fifth amendment is set forth in note 1 supra.
155. 386 U.S. 436 (1966). For the Miranda warnings, see note 51 supra. If an
involuntary statement is obtained in violation of these rights, it is inadmissible.
156. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
157. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); see generally Kamisar, What
Is An Involuntary Confession, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 729 (1963).
158. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); see generally Comment, The Coerc-
ed Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
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Voluntariness is an important factor in the determination of
trustworthiness. 9 The Supreme Court currently holds that, despite
Miranda violations, voluntary statements are admissible for impeach-
159. Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of statements was determined solely
by the voluntariness test set forth in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02
(1961). Unless statements are voluntarily given, they are inadmissible in a criminal
trial either as direct evidence or for impeachment purposes. Mincey v. Arizona 437
U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 67 (1964). The voluntariness of a statement must be determined from the totality
of circumstances. State v. Munro, 295 N.W.2d 437 (Ia. 1980); People v. Kincaid, 42
Ill. 2d. 854, 409 N.E.2d 469 (1980). The factors relevant to voluntariness are (a) the
duration of the interrogation; (b) whether a defendant was partially or wholly informed
of his rights; (c) physical surroundings during the interrogation; (d) whether the inter-
rogator was attempting to elicit a confession in accord with police preconceptions;
(e) whether there was physical abuse or threats thereof; (f) the health of the confessor,
(g) the confessor's prior experience with the law. See Note, Constitutional Law - Con-
fessions - Miranda Warnings Need Not Be Given Where There is no Indication of Ac-
tual Custody and Where the Defendant's Freedom to Depart is not in fact Restricted,
5 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 334, 338 (1977), quoting MCCORMICK, EVICENCE, S 149, at 318 (2d ed.
1972). Another interpretation of the test is whether a self-incriminating statement was
(a) freely self-determined, (b) the product of rational intellect and free will without
compulsion or inducement of any sort and (c) whether the defendant's will was over-
born. Taylor v. Sate, __, Ind. __, 406 N.E.2d 247 (1980); Moss v. State, 386 So.
2d 1129 (Miss. App. 1980). In Moss, the statement of a defendant regarding the shooting
of the victim which was given after the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights
and after the defendant had signed a waiver of his rights in the presence of two
witnesses, which was reduced to wliting by a deputy sheriff, read to the defendant,
and signed by him in the presence of three witnesses, and which was testified to by
the witnesses as being under no threats, promises, force or pressure of any kind, was
entirely voluntary and was properly admitted into evidence.
The practice that the defendant is entitled to a pre-trial hearing to determine
voluntariness (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) has been varied among state courts:
Those states in favor of the Denno hearing are New York, People v. Lithy, 353 N.Y.2d
301 (N.Y.Cr.Ct. 1974); and Florida, Retherford v. State, 265 So. 2d 80, quashed, 270
'So. 2d 363, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (Fla. App. 1972). Those state courts not requiring
a Denno hearing before a confession is usable for impeachment purposes are Kansas,
State v. Andrews, 218 Kan. 156, 542 P.2d 325 (1975); Arkansas, Williams v. State, 523
S.W.2d 377 (Ark 1975) and Illinois, People v. Moore, 54 Ill. 2d 25, 294 N.E.2d 297 (1973).
When the defendant challenges the statement as involuntary, the prosecution
must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477 (1972). States may differ and require a higher standard. State v. Vernon,
385 So. 2d 200 (La. 1980). The Louisiana court held that before a confession or in-
culpatory statement may be introduced into evidence, the state must prove affirmatively
and beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was free and voluntary and not
made under the influence of fear, duress, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.
After the Denno hearing, the judge is required to make an unambiguous ruling for
the record. United States v. Brown, 575 F.2d 796, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1978) (independent
determination of the voluntariness issue is required of federal courts); accord, Beckwith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), reaffirmed the voluntariness standard
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ment purposes.16 This position is premised on the assumption that
if a defendant makes a statement of his own free will, and not because
of pressure exerted by the police, the statement is trustworthy."6 ' Con-
versely, involuntary statements cannot be used for any purpose
because they are not trustworthy."2 Therefore, the reliability of prear-
rest silence in determining a defendant's credibility may rest upon
whether prearrest silence more closely resembles an involuntary state-
ment or a voluntary statement.
Although silence is neither a statement nor an utterance, it can
be communicative and thereby equated to a statement.'" If the defend-
ant is subjected to police coercion, there are many reasons why he
might make an involuntary statement. These reasons include a desire
to be free of questioning, a misunderstanding of his rights, a belief
that his self-defense story will be unaccepted, or the hope that he
will escape severe punishment by telling the police what he believes
they want to hear. These statements are not trustworthy because the
motivations which trigger them are inherently ambiguous. Prearrest
silence is similarly ambiguous."4
Not only is prearrest silence ambiguous as demonstrated by the
use of different fact situations and by application of the Court's
analysis of post-arrest silence, 6 ' but its use for impeachment indirect-
which Miranda did not reach: "Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). There is general agreement among the
judiciary that voluntary statements can be used for impeachment despite a Miranda
violation. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 224. For a general overview of voluntariness,
see Note, Project Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals 1978-1979, 68 GEO. L. J. 269, 376-79 (1979).
The trustworthiness factor is not solely determinative of voluntariness. Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); but cf. Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
160. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971). California, Pennyslvania, and Hawaii have rejected Harris as a matter of state
constitutional law. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1976); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); State v. San-
tiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). Alaska has also rejected Harris by adopting
Rule 26(g) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure.
161. See note 157 supra; Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment
Right to Silence, 16 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 205 (1979).
162. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385. 398 (1978).
163. Id. See also advisory committee notes following Federal Rule of Evidence
801.
164. See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 88-91, 97-111 supra and accompanying text.
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ly produces coercion. By upholding the use of prearrest silence in
Jenkins, the Supreme Court, in effect, issued an ultimatum to future
defendants: either report the crime immediately, despite the self-
incriminating aspects, or suffer the consequences through the prosecu-
tion's use of silence to impeach exculpatory testimony at trial. This
dilemma amounts to indirect compulsion.
The Supreme Court recently upheld indirect compulsion." In the
lower court, the prosecution, during closing argument, questioned the
defendant's failure to report his alibi before arrest."7 The Seventh
Circuit made three important determinations. First, it found no legal
distinction between the prosecutor's comments to the jury and any
attempt he might have undertaken to impeach the defendant or the
defendant's alibi witness on cross-examination.'" Second, the court held
that the prosecutor's comments about the defendant's prearrest silence
constituted an impermissible invasion of the defendant's rights since
the remarks were "of such a nature that the jury would naturally
and necessarily take them to be a comment on the defendant's
silence." '169 Third, such invasion of the defendant's rights was found
to be in constitutional error. 7 ' But the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded Rowe to be reviewed in light of
Jenkins v. Anderson.'71
Hence, the remand of Rowe indicates that Jenkins has broader
implications than its impact on prearrest silence, since Rowe exercised
his right not to testify and to remain silent pursuant to the fifth
amendment. The Court's decision therefore fosters indirect compul-
sion of a defendant to report a crime before arrest. Ambiguity and
a close affiliation with government coercion are two characteristics
common to both prearrest silence and involuntary statements. There-
fore, since prearrest silence is more like the involuntary statement
than the voluntary statement, it too should be barred from any use.
Prearrest silence may be communicative as an implied assertion, but
whether it conveys a trustworthy and reliable communication is purely
speculative. To allow such an ambiguous and therefore prejudicial piece
of evidence to discredit a defendant's testimony infringes upon con-
stitutional safeguards.
166. United States v. Rowe, 618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 449 U.S.
810 (1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 810 (1980).
167. Id. at 1207.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1210.
170. Id. at 1213.
171. 449 U.S. 810, (1980).
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The Supreme Court set forth a test to determine whether such
a burden upon the exercise of constitutional rights is an impermissi-
ble penalty."' The test stipulates that a burden becomes a penalty
if any traditional fifth amendment "right to silence" policies are
impaired173 or if the state's burden in proving a defendant guilty is
materially lessened. 7" United States v. Hale 5 states that the reduc-
tion of the state's burden is an evidentiary bar to impeachment use
of prearrest silence.7 " To bar such use on constitutional grounds, the
burden flowing from the impeachment must substantially impair a con-
stitutional policy.'77 It is the ambiguity of prearrest silence, the
unknown reason for maintaing such silence, that makes it untrustwor-
thy as evidence and its use thereby constitutes a penalty.
Furthermore, even if the defendant is not penalized by such a
burden, another fifth amendment concern is whether the goals of us-
ing prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility are met. The
apparent objectives are to deter perjury and to encourage the report-
ing of crimes. Though the fear of prejury is valid, it must be strictly
balanced against both the defendant's right not to incrimiate himself
and the policy to prohibit police misconduct.7 8 It must, however, be
the goal of deterring perjury that is sought and not the goal of burden-
ing a defendant's right to testify. The right to testify is burdened
if a defendant's prearrest silence can impeach his testimony. Such a
burden on the right to testify dilutes the constitutional rights
guaranteed a criminal defendant.
The fear of a defendant's intentional perjury prompted the Court
to distinguish the prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior
silence to show guilt, from the use of prior silence for impeachment
purposes." Raffel expressly held that the defendant's silence at a prior
trial was admissible for purposes of impeachment, despite the federal
172. Chaffin v. Styncheombe, 412 U.S. 12 (1973); McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 215-16 (1971); see also Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). The court
held the fifth amendment privilege to be a "right to remain silent unless he (defen-
dant) chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty for . . . such silence." Id.
173. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 213.
174. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
175. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
176. See notes 62-120 supra and accompanying text.
177. Mincey v. Arizona; 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
178. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954); see Comment, People v.
Disbrow: Halting the Erosion of the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 9 So. W. L. REV.
771, 778 (1977).
179. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1926).
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court prohibition of a defendant's silence in the prosecution's case-in-
chief as evidence of guilt.'" Jenkins v. Anderson'8 revitalized the Raf-
fel holding that a defendant's decision to take the stand is a waiver
of his right to remain silent.182
A reason for the Jenkins conclusion may be the traditional
posture of cross-examination itself. Cross-examination to attack the
credibility of a witness is largely discretionary as to the extent and
period to be covered. 3 The relation and apparent character of the
witness under examination and the circumstances attending the par-
ticular case determine the scope of cross-examination." The cross-
examiner should be accorded wide latitude in attempting to elicit facts
that would tend to impeach or contradict testimony given on direct
examination.'"
However, it is impermissible to accomplish indirectly that which
cannot be accomplished directlly." Because Raffel 87 dilutes a defend-
ant's fifth amendment right to remain silent by burdening the exer-
cise of his right to testify in his own behalf, it is indirectly circumvent-
ing an express constitutional prohibition. Hence, the fear of perjury
should not permit the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defend-
ant's exculpatory testimony unless the possibility of perjury outweighs
the consequences of the dilution.
The second fifth amendment goal of increasing the reporting of
crimes is, however, not so acceptable a goal even if analyzed through
a balancing process like the prejury aspect. The sanction of impeach-
ment use of prearrest silence does not encourage reporting. There
is no duty to speak,' and where there is no duty to speak, silence
is void of meaning or at least cannot be deemed the equivalent of
concealment or suppression.'89 However, a New York appellate court
180. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
181. 447 U.S. 231, (1980).
182. Id. at 241 (Stevens J., concurring); see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 632-33
(Stevens J., dissenting).
183. Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. 209 (1 Black) 1861.
184. Parr v. McDade, 161 Ind. App. 106, 314 N.E.2d 768 (1974).
185. Self v. Dye, 257 Ark. 360, 516 S.W.2d 397 (1974).
186. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
187. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
188. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (absent an alibi statute, the defen-
dant has no duty to inform the police of his alibi); Mabury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. 556
(7 Wheat.) 1822 "(It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender and to
proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would punish
him in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for man." Id. at 575-76.).
189. Chicora Fertilizer Co. v. Dunan, 91 Md. 144, 148, 46 A. 347, 351 (1900):
"There is a distinction between the suppression of a fact and mere silence. Where
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held that a police officer has a duty to report."9 The court stated
that the duty to report is limited to people in positions similar to
that of a police officer. The court reasoned that the official status
of a law enforcement officer requires him to promptly report an il-
legal act.' It is questionable, however, whether a reasonable person,
without such a duty, would report a crime even if a duty existed.
If a defendant thinks about the prearrest impeachment sanction,
it surely serves as a deterrent to reporting."9 According to the analysis
on the duration of prearrest silence," if a person has waited a week,
or even a day, he probably will not report. This result is foreseeable
because any period between the crime and the reporting constitutes
prearrest silence which may be used to impeach a defendant's ex-
culpatory testimony. Therefore, the impeachment use of prearrest
silence only adds to the defendant's dilemma. The purpose of the fifth
amendment is to prohibit the government from encouraging or dis-
couraging any act by a defendant which would serve to incriminate
him."' Thus, rather than encouraging crime reporting, the sanction
of impeachment deters reporting.
Furthermore, by such sanction, the government compels the
defendant to incriminate himself. Delay only aggravates the self-
incriminating aspect of the reporting compelled by the government.
Even though the impeachment sanction's goal of deterring perjury
may prevail on a balancing test, the goal of encouraging reporting
fails. By this analysis, then, the use of prearrest silence for impeach-
ment does not constitute harmless error,9' but dilutes a defendant's
fifth amendment rights."'
To prevent dilution of a defendant's rights, traditional constitu-
there is an obligation to speak, a failure to speak will constitute the suppression of
a fact; but where there is no obligation to speak, silence cannot be termed suppres-
sion." Id. Accord, Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranch Co., 128 U.S. 382, 388 (1888) ("[Mlere
silence is quite different from concealment." Id.)
190. People v. Rothchild, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901, 35 N.Y. 740, 320 N.E.2d 639 (1974).
But see United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1979).
191. Rothchild, 361 N.Y.S.2d at -, 35 N.Y. at - , 340 N.E. at 642.
192. This is particularly true in those cases where a defendant maintains silence
on the advice of his attorney; see note 96 supra.
193. See notes 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
194. See note 1 supra; e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
195. See note 197 infra.
196. Note, Criminal Law-Self Incrimination - Failure to Relate Exculpatory
Story at Pretrial Hearings May Be Used By The Prosecution to Impeach a Defendant's
Testimony at Trial, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 632 (1979): "A defendant will not know whether
to speak or remain silent lest his silence be misconstrued. A defendant should be under
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tional policies must be preserved. Since trustworthiness is a major
concern, it should not be cast aside for the sake of furthering the
goals of avoiding perjury and encouraging reporting of crimes. More-
over, since at least one of two apparent goals is invalid, to maintain
the sanction for the sake of a fear of perjury on the theory of harmless
error would be an intolerable penalty to the defendant. Prearrest
silence closely resembles an involuntary statement. Involuntary
statements are inadmissible for lack of trustworthiness to impeach
a defendant's trial testimony. It follows that prearrest silence should
be similarly excluded. Finally, the criminal defendant's sacrifice of his
right to testify in his own behalf to maintain his fifth amendment
right not to incriminate himself, is a dilution of his traditional con-
stitutional rights.
Conclusion
The narrow focus of the Jenkins decision left many unresolved
evidentiary and constitutional questions. Since the Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to create evidentiary guidelines for the states,
the numerous evidentiary questions arising from Jenkins are destined
for conflicting resolutions. However, prearrest silence is so inherent-
ly ambiguous that it is not relevant to impeach a defendant's exclu-
patory testimony. Neither the duration of the silence, nor the use of
it in conjunction with other prearrest acts, is sufficient to make it
relevant to any material issue. Therefore, it is irrelevant to make any
disputed fact more or less probable. Any probative value that prear-
rest silence might have, is outweighed by the prejudicial impact of
such silence when it is used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testi-
mony. Furthermore, since prearrest silence is not inconsistent with
later exculpatory testimony, it should not be allowed as a prior in-
consistent statement to impeach such testimony.
The inconsistency of the Jenkins decision with traditional con-
stitutional concerns, threatens to dilute the defendant's traditional con-
stitutional rights. The Court's goal to deter perjury and encourage
crime reporting are insufficient to divest a criminal defendant of his
right to remain silent and to practice his right to later testify in his
own behalf. Furthermore, the traditional constitutional concern for
trustworthiness which has always helped to ensure the discovery of
truth, should not be sacrificed by allowing the government to indirectly
compel a defendant to report an event which will likely be incrim-
no compulsion to speak unless he chooses to do so.... To hold otherwise is to serious-
ly abridge a right that is fundamental to traditional concepts of justice." Id. See also
Note, Silence As Incrimination In Federal Courts, 90 MINN L. REV. 598, 640 (1955-56).
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inating. Like the involuntary statement, prearrest silence is not
trustworthy and should be inadmissible for all purposes. 1
7
The most disturbing aspect of Jenkins is that it may eventually
be the rationale used to admit post-arrest silence to impeach a defend-
ant's testimony. 9' The Supreme Court has recently remanded a state
supreme court decision and a circuit court decision that held post-
arrest silence inadmissible for impeachment purposes for re-examina-
tion in light of Jenkins."'
Analysis of prearrest silence has shown several things. First, it
is irrelevant to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. Second, even
if it is relevant, the use of prearrest silence is outweighed by its pre-
judice. Third, use of prearrest silence for impeachment is inconsis-
tent with traditional fifth amendment concerns. Finally, the ramifica-
tions of Jenkins threaten to allow the use of a defendant's post-arrest
silence for impeachment. Where and when the Court will stop this
trend of restricting a defendant's constitutional rights is questionable
and frightening.
Debra M. Williamson
197. The real threat of the Jenkins decision in the law of prearrest silence
is the impending ramifications of the unresolved issues as discussed in the text. One
such outgrowth may presently be a reality in many courts. The issue facing these
courts is how a judge should rule in light of the consequences to a defendant if the
prearrest silence is admissible impeachment evidence and to the government if such
silence is denied admission. If the defendant's objection to the impeachment use of
prearrest silence is overruled, the defendant has an extremely heavy burden to con-
vince the appellate court that its use was so prejudicial as to require reversal. Because
of the wide use of harmless error (harmless error occurs when there is no reasonable
possibility that error might have contributed to the conviction. United States v. Rowe,
618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 810 (1980), vacated and remanded, 449
U.S. 810 (1980)), many judges will find its use impermissible but not demanding rever-
sal. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966). Alternatively, if the objection
is sustained and the defendant is acquitted, the prosecution is left with no recourse
as they are barred by the double jeopardy rule.
198. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
199. New York v. Conyers, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, 400 N.E.2d, 342, 49 N.Y.2d 174,
cert. granted, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 809 (1980) in light
of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). In Conyers, the prosecutor commented
on the defendant's silence at the time of arrest. The New York Supreme Court found
this to be impermissible in light of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Supreme
Court has now remanded it for review in light of Jenkins; United States v. Rowe,
618 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), vacated and remanded, 449
U.S. 809 (1980) in light of Jenkins. The prosecution indirectly commented on the defen-
dant's pre-arrest silence through comments on his alibi witness' prearrest silence. The
Seventh Circuit found the comments to be impermissible and granted a new trial within
120 days or a writ would issue. The Supreme Court remanded the case to be deter-
mined in light of Jenkins.
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